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A critical determinant of China’s long-term econom-ic growth and social stability will be whether thewealth of its economic boom can reach the majori-
ty of its 700 million farmers, who make up approximately
56 percent of the total population. The benefits that the
rural population has received from the economic reforms
of the past two and a half decades, while significant, were
largely achieved in the 1980s, and now the countryside lags
badly behind the urban sector. A survey we conducted in 17
provinces, among 1,962 farmers and other respondents,
confirms one fundamental cause of the widening rural-
urban income gap: most Chinese farmers still lack secure
and marketable land rights that would allow them to make
long-term investments in land, decisively improve produc-
tivity, and accumulate wealth.
Farmers in China face multiple threats to their land
rights from local government and village officials. The most
prominent threat is land expropriation or acquisition
through eminent domain to satisfy demands of industrial
growth or urban expansion. Despite a series of central laws
and policies, in practice, farmers who lose their land typical-
ly receive little or no compensation. Closely related as anoth-
er source of insecurity of land rights is the persistent “read-
justment” or “reallocation” of farmers’ landholdings that is
administratively conducted by village officials. Today, such
land-related problems are the number one cause for rural
grievances and unrest in China, which reported 17,900 cases
of “massive rural incidents” of farmers’ protests in the first
nine months of 2006.
China adopted a Property Law in March 2007 that aims to
strengthen the security of farmers’ land rights, and the next
key step will be full implementation of the law. We calculate
that securing rural land rights would bring more than half a
trillion dollars of value to farmers. Implementing the proper-
ty law requires major institutional and legal measures on sev-
eral fronts that China must tackle in the immediate future. 
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Executive Summary
Introduction
The Chinese government often boasts that
one of its greatest achievements is feeding
China’s entire population, constituting 22
percent of the world’s population, with only 9
percent of the world’s arable land. That is
indeed extraordinary considering that only 50
years ago tens of millions of Chinese starved to
death.
However, visiting China’s countryside and
asking who actually “owns” the farmland pro-
duces answers so drastically different that one
could easily conclude that no one really knows.
Is the true owner of a given property the nation-
al or the local government? Are the owners the
villages or the farmers? Considering that China
contains 121.8 million hectares of arable land
(1 hectare = 2.47 acres), its ownership is proba-
bly the biggest unresolved question on proper-
ty in China, and is, unequivocally, one of the
most critical questions for the 700 million rural
Chinese who live there. 
Despite the stellar growth of the Chinese
economy in recent decades, economic produc-
tion is largely centered in the eastern coastal
region. The rural economy is lagging far
behind the urban sector. China is now experi-
encing one of the worst rural-urban income
gaps in the world. In 2006, the rural-urban
income ratio reached a record low (1:3.28), and
the speed of income polarization is accelerat-
ing (see Figure 1).
According to official data, the average
Chinese farmer made approximately $450 U.S.
in 2006, and 35.5 million rural people earned
less than $120 U.S. (All subsequent currency
references refer to U.S. dollars.) Poverty allevia-
tion remains the principal issue for China’s
countryside.1
This worsening income disparity reflects a
lack of opportunity for, and a threat to the gen-
eral welfare of, Chinese farmers. If the sources
of this income disparity are not addressed in
the near future, the country’s long-term
growth and stability will be in jeopardy. It has
been reported that rural healthcare and ele-
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mentary education are facing an impending
crisis as numerous farmers struggle to pay chil-
dren’s hospital bills or school tuitions. An
urban child is 3.4 times more likely to attend
high school and 43.8 times more likely to
attend college than a rural child.2 Moreover,
there are an estimated 700,000 deaths of chil-
dren under the age of five in China each year—
the great majority of which occur in the coun-
tryside.3
Both Chinese and foreign observers have
noted an increase in incidents of rural unrest,
including violent confrontations between
local governments and farmers. In the first
nine months of 2006, China reported a total
of 17,900 cases of “massive rural incidents” in
which a total of 385,000 farmers protested
against the government. Approximately 80
percent of these incidents were related to ille-
gal land-takings.4 Land-related conflicts,
especially arising from land takings or expro-
priations by governments, are now the top
rural grievance in China.5 In January 2006,
Premier Wen Jiabao admitted that the efforts
to narrow the rural-urban wealth gap had
fallen short and that land grabs by officials
were provoking mass unrest in the country-
side and could threaten national stability
and economic growth.6
This paper attempts to shed light on these
issues by reviewing the development of
China’s rural land-rights and the status of
farmers’ property rights under current laws
and policies. It will then discuss how improv-
ing the security of land rights can bring
about enormous benefits for millions of
China’s rural poor. 
Historical Background
In the first half of the 20th century, the
Chinese revolution led by the Communist
Party gained much of its support from the
deeply aggrieved rural poor. This support
was especially derived from the large popula-
tion of tenant farmers who had neither
secure nor equitable access to land and who
paid high rents to their landlords. After com-
ing to power in 1949, the Communist Party’s
initial land reform gave farmers full, private
ownership of their small farms through a
Land Reform Law and other accompanying
regulations. Through this law China redis-
tributed over half of its arable land to 50–60
million poor rural households—more than
60 percent of its rural population—on an
equitable, per capita basis.7 Land titles or cer-
tificates were issued to farmers as well. This
“land to the tiller” campaign lifted hundreds
of millions of poor Chinese out of destitu-
tion and hunger. Annual crop production
increased 70 percent from 113.2 million tons
to 192.7 million tons between 1949 and
1956. Similarly, total farm income rose 85
percent during the same period.8
The Chinese land-to-tiller program, and
its initial results, paralleled the successful
postwar land-to-tiller programs in Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan, although with two
important differences: the mainland pro-
gram was avowedly confiscatory as to larger
landlords, and at the village level physical
punishment, including the death sentence,
was often carried out against landlords. 
Disastrously, in the mid-1950s, China fol-
lowed in the footsteps of the former Soviet
Union and started the collectivization of all
farming.9 Private ownership of land became
illegal. With “collectives” (villages or village
teams) as the new owners, farmers became col-
lective farms’ “working members,” who nor-
mally received pay (mostly grain and other
agricultural products) on the basis of how
much time they put into work. In 1958 the sit-
uation was further exacerbated, with a move to
giant “communes” and the termination of the
“private lots” that had allowed farmers to hold
up to five percent of the land privately, outside
the collective-farming system. Agricultural
production plummeted causing 15 to 30 mil-
lion deaths between 1958 and 1962.10 Modest
reforms, beginning in 1962, ratcheted back the
production unit from the communes to village
teams and restored private plots. Production
then began a long, slow recovery. 
In the late 1970s, several regions of China
began to experiment with tearing down the
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collective farms and giving individual farmers
limited freedom to farm. Technically, the col-
lectives retained ownership of the land and
allocated or “contracted out” land parcels to
individual households for private farming for
a period of time. The land allocation was
mostly in equal per capita shares based on
family size. The contracting households, in
return, were obligated to fulfill their “respon-
sibilities” in harvest quotas or taxes to the col-
lectives every year (in the form of grain or
cash). This scheme was called the “Household
Responsibility System” or the HRS.
After its initial success, the experiment
spread rapidly and became the fundamental
system of rural land tenure throughout China.
The introduction of the HRS unleashed the
energy and resources of millions of rural fami-
lies and jump-started China’s agricultural
growth. Between 1979 and 1984, average net
income for rural residents increased by 11 per-
cent annually, resulting in the narrowest rural-
urban income gap of the past several decades.
The HRS was an enormously successful
reform, lifting the living standards of hun-
dreds of millions of rural people and was the
driving force behind the single greatest pover-
ty-reduction achievement worldwide in the
past three decades.11
Despite the achievements of the HRS, sever-
al looming questions were left unresolved and
still remain. One is the definition of farmers’
rights to their contracted land, technically
referred to as “land-use rights” or “land-con-
tracting or -operating rights.” Since collectives
still officially own the land, there is little guid-
ance as to what land-use rights really entail. The
other problem is the duration of farmers’ land-
use rights. Initially, in the early 1980s, the rights
lasted only about three years, or even less. A
1984 policy document purported to increase
the duration to 15 years, but it was never seri-
ously publicized or implemented. The lack of
secure and long-term rights discouraged farm-
ers from making the mid- to long-term invest-
ments in land that were needed to achieve fur-
ther, larger production increases. 
As a response, the Chinese government
adopted a series of policies and laws to
address these issues. Four of them are partic-
ularly important:
• In 1993, the central government issued
a policy directive that extended farmers’
land-use rights to a continuous and
fixed term of 30 years.12 This was the
first time that farmers’ land-use rights
were substantially lengthened and fol-
lowed by at least some degree of actual
implementation. 
• In 1998, the 30-year policy was embod-
ied in formal law for the first time as a
result of the adoption of the revised
Land Management Law. The law explic-
itly mandates that land be contracted to
farm households for a term of 30
years.13 At the same time, China initiat-
ed a massive campaign to implement
the new policy, including issuance of
land-rights documentation to farmers
and widespread publicity of the 30-year
rights. 
• In 2002, the National People’s Congress
enacted a Rural Land Contracting Law
devoted entirely to the relationship
between collectives’ land-ownership
rights and farmers’ land-use rights. The
RLCL clarified the content of land-use
rights and provided legal remedies for
any violations.14
• In 2007, China adopted a Property Law,
the first comprehensive civil property
code in modern Chinese history.15 The
Property Law characterizes farmers’
rural land-use rights as property rights
or rights in rem (as opposed to the con-
tractual rights defined by previous
laws), providing greater protection for
small farmers’ land rights. 
China’s land reform has been significant,
but the road to fully secure, marketable, and
long-term land rights for all farmers is still a
long one. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all
conducted extremely successful land reforms
after World War II by providing small farmers
with private ownership of land. China will be
able to replicate such experiences if the gov-
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ernment can effectively and faithfully imple-
ment its recent pro-farmer policies and laws. 
There are two contextual points to keep in
mind here. First, the rule of law is not firmly
established in China, and the government
relies heavily on policy or administrative initia-
tives to push its agenda, in addition to or in
lieu of formal legal measures. A case in point is
the 1993 policy extending farmers’ land rights
to 30 years, which the government began to
carry out before formalizing it into law. The
Central Committee of the Communist Party
often leads the charge by issuing policy direc-
tives, and then the National People’s Congress,
which is controlled by the Communist Party,
follows by codifying the policies into formal
law. The policies are not legally binding, but
they receive close attention from local bureau-
crats who are responsible for carrying out the
programs or campaigns.
The second point is related to how China’s
political structure is being shaped by compet-
ing economic interests. China revamped its tax
revenue system in 1994. Power over taxation
was centralized and local governments lost
most of their freedom to collect and keep local
taxes. That had two consequences that are rel-
evant to this paper. First, virtually all local gov-
ernments have been facing fiscal shortages and
are forced to seek extra-budgetary revenue. In
fact, extra-budgetary revenue makes up more
than 60 percent of local governmental expen-
ditures.16 The biggest source of extra-bud-
getary revenue is the sale or lease of land (often
rural land). The new tax system also partially
explains why the tax burden on Chinese farm-
ers increased dramatically starting in the late
1990s (though the tax was eliminated or great-
ly reduced during a recent pro-farmer pro-
gram, as discussed below). Second, local gov-
ernments have been unable to fully implement
a number of unfunded or underfunded policy
directives from the central government (e.g.,
mandatory elementary education or basic
healthcare). Local governments may just pay
lip service or turn a blind eye to central policies
that are against their own interest, including
policies that restrict their authority to sell off
farmers’ lands. 
Those background conditions have affect-
ed the three primary aspects of land rights:
security, marketability, and duration.
Insecure Land Rights
The biggest threats to farmers’ land rights
come from the government in the form of
land takings and land readjustments.
Land Takings
Land confiscation by governments for non-
agricultural purposes through the eminent
domain power (state expropriation or acquisi-
tion) is probably the most visible and con-
tentious rural issue in modern day China.
Under the current legal regime, farmers often
do not receive due process, owing to insuffi-
cient compensation and a lack of procedural
transparency. As a result, China’s urban-biased
development is heavily “financed” by farmland
taken for nonagricultural purposes. Further,
the bulk of the compensation allowed by cur-
rent laws and policies—grossly inadequate as it
is—is routinely intercepted by local govern-
ments and village officials. Meanwhile, affected
farmers have been prevented from voicing their
opinions in a meaningful way during the land-
taking proceedings because they have no way
of receiving proper notice. To make matters
even worse, dispossessed farmers seldom have
access to independent courts for an unbiased
ruling and sometimes resort to violent con-
frontations. For these reasons, land-related
issues arising from state expropriations or
acquisitions have recently become the top
cause of rural grievances. 
According to a 17-province, 1,962-farmer/
respondent survey conducted in China in 2005
by the Seattle-based Rural Development
Institute, Renmin University (Beijing), and
Michigan State University, incidents of land
takings have increased more than 15 times
during the past 10 years and appear to be accel-
erating.17 Accordingly, farmers are facing an
ever-increasing threat of losing their land and
livelihoods to urbanization and nonagricultur-
al development. 
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First, a large amount of rural land is taken or
expropriated by governments for purely private
or commercial purposes. Both the Chinese
Constitution and the 1998 LML require that
land takings be for the “public interest.”18
Under the present legal regime, a farmer has no
power to negotiate or make a private transfer of
his or her land rights for a nonagricultural use.
If a commercial developer is interested in con-
verting a piece of agricultural land to nonagri-
cultural use, he or she has to petition the
responsible government agency or local govern-
ment to exercise its eminent domain power to
legally change the land-use designation.
Furthermore, as land became a primary source
of local governments’ patronage and wealth, it
also became a resource for local development by
attracting investment and boosting real estate
development. Consequently, local governments
tend to emphasize their development agenda
when expropriating land for new urban resi-
dence apartments or roadside gas stations by
stating that the new developments are in the
best interest of the local community.19
Second, a lack of due process prevents
farmers from voicing their opinions. The 2005
survey indicates that approximately 30 per-
cent of affected farmers were not notified of
land takings in advance. On the amount of
compensation, arguably the most pivotal
issue, only one out of every five farmers was
consulted. Less than 1 percent of all surveyed
farmers were able to file formal lawsuits to
resolve these grievances.20 The central govern-
ment has promulgated a series of regulations
and policies providing farmers with procedur-
al rights such as public hearings. While these
rights exist on paper, in practice the decision-
making processes are far from transparent,
participatory, or fair.
Lastly and fully as important, compensa-
tion for farmers’ lost land is often grossly inad-
equate. The 1998 LML sets up a specific for-
mula to determine the amount of two primary
types of compensation: one for loss of land and
the other for resettlement. The law explicitly
provides that the compensation for loss of land
should be 6 to 10 times the average annual
yield of the land, and the resettlement subsidy
should be between 4 to 6 times the average
annual yield.21 The compensation derived
from this formula is far from sufficient
because the formula does not consider the fair-
market value of the land or the full range of
negative impacts on farmers. Since the formu-
la does not take market value into account, it
does not allow farmers to profit from the
appreciation of land value due to development
projects. The current compensation scheme
allows the government to pay farmers $5,000
to expropriate one hectare of rural land today,
sell it tomorrow to developers at the full mar-
ket value of $20,000, pocket a handsome prof-
it of $15,000, and call it “extra-budgetary rev-
enue.” In contrast, if farmers are allowed to sell
their one hectare directly to developers for
commercial purposes, they will be paid the full
market value of $20,000.
The injustice doesn’t stop there. Under
the current law, the $5,000 paid to expropri-
ate the one hectare in the example above is
not paid to the farmers but to the collective,
which technically remains the owner of the
land. The collective then decides how much
will go into the hands of dispossessed farm-
ers. Because collective villages or collective
village teams are not democratically orga-
nized, the average farmer who typically
knows little about his legal rights, may be at
the mercy of a few village officials. As many
studies reveal, land-losing farmers typically
receive only 10–20 percent of a $20,000
expropriation. That process has led to
approximately two-thirds of affected farmers
being dissatisfied with their compensation.22
The central government seems to be aware
of these grave problems but is unable to curb
the nationwide phenomenon. Since 2004,
the central government issued a number of
harshly worded policy directives ordering
local governments to behave.23 These new
policy directives and the 2007 Property Law
also establish a new compensation standard
mandating that compensation for land tak-
ings must be adequate to maintain affected
farmers’ living standards for the long term.
Nevertheless, without strong supporting
institutions and accompanying reforms, the
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financial incentives behind these land tak-
ings are too strong for local governments to
resist. 
Land Readjustments
Although land-use rights are theoretically
allocated to farm households for a specific
number of years (30 years under the law),
most villages in China have adopted the prac-
tice of periodically readjusting or reallocating
landholdings. These land shakeups occur
due to changes in individual household
makeup, total village population, or loss of
land through land takings or natural disas-
ters. In those cases that are called “big read-
justments,” a village takes back all land from
farmers and then redistributes it. A “small”
or partial readjustment consists of adding to
or taking from a household’s existing land-
holding when that family’s size changes (e.g.,
through births, deaths, or marriages), and
does not affect the entire village’s landhold-
ing pattern. It is not uncommon for a few vil-
lage cadres or officials to conduct readjust-
ments simply to exert their authority or for
other dubious purposes.
Rights to a piece of land subject to peri-
odic and unexpected readjustments cannot
be considered either secure or marketable.
Farmers will not make mid- to long-term
investments on a land parcel that they may
not possess the next year or the year after.
Similarly, from a transferee’s perspective,
land transactions are limited to those whose
purpose will be completed by the end of the
current crop season or agricultural year. 
The 2002 Rural Land Contracting Law
(RLCL) was enacted in response to these
readjustments and prohibits land readjust-
ments during the 30-year term except for
“special circumstances such as natural disas-
ters.”24 Yet, a large number of village collec-
tives are continuing the illegal practice. The
farmer survey reveals that 30 percent of vil-
lages carried out readjustments after, and
despite, farmers’ having purportedly been
given 30-year rights.25 This is an alarming
discovery because the main policy and leg-
islative purpose of 30-year land-use rights is
to ensure that farmers can confidently pos-
sess and farm the same land for a continuous
30-year term, resulting in more mid- to long-
term investments that improve agricultural
productivity. Any readjustment conducted
administratively by villages destroys the secu-
rity of the 30-year rights and undermines
agricultural production. As evidenced by the
2005 survey, more than three-fourths of
farmers surveyed did not want any more
readjustments.26
In practice, the narrow exception created
by the RLCL, whereby readjustments are per-
missible under “special circumstances such
as natural disasters,” has been misunder-
stood or abused by villages that insist on fur-
ther readjustments. A number of provinces
have issued implementation regulations of
the RLCL, and there is great discrepancy
among them on the definition of “special cir-
cumstances.” Accordingly, many local or vil-
lage officials consider that the door has not
been fully closed, and farmers continue to
face this threat to the security of their land
rights. 
With land improvements constrained by
ongoing takings and readjustments, the initial
benefits brought about by the Household
Responsibility System tailed off beginning in
the mid-1980s, causing Chinese farmers’
income gains to begin to lag far behind those
of urban residents. 
Marketability Restrained 
Land is the single greatest asset for the
world’s rural poor. Where the rights to land
cannot be freely transferred in the market
because of uncertainties, lack of documenta-
tion, or legal restraints, the land’s value is
greatly diminished. The Peruvian economist
Hernando de Soto has aptly called such land
“dead capital” and has emphasized the key
role that measures intended to make this cap-
ital “live” can play in the overall process of eco-
nomic development.27
Although Chinese farmers’ land rights
have been theoretically transferable for contin-
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uing agricultural uses for more than two
decades, the market for these rights has been
severely constrained. The insecurity of farm-
ers’ holdings has meant that nearly all trans-
actions have been at will or for one year at a
time. Experience elsewhere in Asia suggests
that securing land rights for Chinese farmers,
in a developed land market—discounting for
the 30-year term and considering them for
agricultural purposes only—should bring
more than half a trillion dollars of value to
farmers.28
The rural land-transfer market in China’s
countryside is still at a very early stage.
Roughly a third of rural households have been
parties to a land transfer (transfer-out or
transfer-in). Scrutinized more closely, nearly
half of these transactions cannot be construed
as market transactions because they were at
will, oral transfers among relatives of the same
village without any rent paid.29
The frequency of rural land transfers is tied
closely to three factors. The first factor is loca-
tion. Farmers typically report a greater num-
ber of transfers in regions where the economy
is more developed, such as certain coastal
regions in Guangdong or Zhejiang provinces.
Rural land transfers also appear to be some-
what related to how many rural adults become
migrant workers and choose to work in cities.
Millions have obtained stable urban income
and thus moved to the cities. The movement
of labor is massive in China and certainly con-
tributes favorably to the development of the
rural land-transfer market. Lastly, the low fre-
quency of transfers in some areas is also par-
tially due to farmers’ lack of knowledge about
their rights to land and various aspects of
those rights that affect transfer. The farmer
survey confirms that a majority of interviewed
farmers still hold mistaken beliefs that are
likely to inhibit transfers, especially transfers
for long periods of time.30
Another key deficiency in the land market
is that Chinese laws ban mortgaging arable
land. The main fear is that farmers may
engage in unwise deals, using their land as col-
lateral, and eventually losing the land to banks
or a small number of rich people. The term
“landlord” carries such heavy political baggage
that a meaningful debate on the pros and cons
of mortgage becomes difficult. Yet mortgage
is universally accepted as a means for urban
residents to obtain credit. The controversy sur-
rounding rural land mortgage is reflected in
the drafting of the 2007 Property Law. One of
the earlier drafts of the Property Law allowed
mortgages, but the clause was eventually
scratched off. 
As the experiences of many countries have
consistently proven, access to credit is an im-
portant factor in farmers’ ability to make long-
term, productivity-enhancing and income-
generating investments in their land. This
issue is made more acute by the fact that only
14.7 percent of Chinese farmers’ investments
were able to be financed to any degree through
borrowing from a bank.31 As a result, farmers
cannot use their land—their principal asset—
to obtain financing for improvements aimed
at expanding or diversifying agricultural pro-
duction. 
Thirty Years and Beyond
As discussed above, Chinese farmers’ land-
use rights extend for 30 years. In a majority of
cases, the 30 years began in the late 1990s
(1997–99 in particular). Thus, all farmers’
rights to their land are set to expire by the late
2020s. What will happen then?
Leaders of the central government have
counseled farmers not to worry. Former presi-
dent Jiang Zemin once formally announced
that farmers’ land rights should last forever.
Premier Wen Jiabao repeated several times that
farmers’ land rights will “never” be changed.32
There is a consensus at the central level that the
Household Responsibility System will be a per-
manent feature of rural land tenure in China
and that Chinese farmers’ rights to their con-
tracted land should become more secure and
long-term over time.
A telling provision in the new Property
Law is that the term for urban land-use
rights—currently 70 years—automatically
renews. However, in the case of rural land,
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when the present 30-year contract term
expires, the law states that “farmers should
continue extending the contract according to
relevant law.”33 This language is not as strong
as the language covering urban land, which
automatically renews, but it is a clear signal
that the 30-year term will be extended. 
The remaining questions, of course, relate
to the length and manner of the extension.
The best scenario would be automatic and
repeated renewal by operation of law, which
would essentially perpetuate farmers’ rights
to their contracted land. That would entail
the least amount of disturbance and uncer-
tainty. If farmers are required to pay a fee, or
go through a land readjustment to obtain
the renewal, then the security and the market
value of rural land will be considerably
decreased as the end of the term looms. 
Given the ideological inclinations of the
current (and recent past) leadership, it is
unclear if or when China will consider grant-
ing farmers full, private ownership of land. A
small number of Chinese scholars have advo-
cated privatization. But the government con-
siders collective ownership of rural land one
of the fundamental features of a “socialist”
country, so it is unlikely that truly private
ownership will come about in the foreseeable
future. 
Regardless, the issue of utmost and imme-
diate importance is ensuring that all farmers’
land rights are secure and protected during the
present 30-year term. If many farmers continue
to lose their contracted land through illegal
takings or readjustments, the question of
future renewal could become steadily less sig-
nificant. 
Land Rights and the
Creation of Rural Wealth
Why are land rights so important? The
question goes to the heart of poverty allevia-
tion and income growth in the countryside. 
Land is the most basic asset of, and the
best social welfare guaranty for, farmers.
Comparative historical experiences and inde-
pendent studies have repeatedly confirmed
that with long-term, secure land rights, farm-
ers will treasure their land and are likely to
make more mid- to long-term investments in
their land, resulting in higher-efficiency, mar-
ket-driven agricultural operations.34
As of 2002, total value added per hectare in
China’s agricultural sector was about $1,539.35
That leaves much room for improvement,
through diversification into higher value-
added crops and also through increased yields
of existing basic crops. This can happen only
when Chinese farmers know that they will be
able to stay on the same parcel of land and can
confidently invest the money and labor needed
to make long-term improvements. Such
improvements include irrigation wells and
water catchments, drainage improvements,
terracing and careful land leveling, greenhous-
es or trellises, tree-planting, intensive soil
improvement, and new machinery and tech-
nologies. As a rough comparison, agricultural
value added per hectare in South Korea
equaled approximately $22,400 in 2002 and in
Taiwan measured approximately $13,150 in
1997. While these are of course far more devel-
oped societies, this comparison illustrates the
lack of investment being made by Chinese
farmers. In both of the latter settings, nearly all
farmers have long-term security on their land
(full private ownership) as a result of post–
World War II land reforms and have been able
to invest in their land and diversify their pro-
duction free of any threat of readjustment or
taking.36
Implementing secure land rights not only
causes farmers to invest more, but has also
been shown to stimulate the rural land-trans-
fer market which further promotes agricultur-
al efficiency and overall economic growth. In a
developed land market, such as exists in com-
parable developing countries like India and
Indonesia, the average value of one hectare of
agricultural land with full private ownership is
about $5,000.37 However, Chinese farmers
have 30-year use rights instead of full private
ownership. The economic value of a 30-year
use term, at the beginning of that term, is
roughly 75 percent to 95 percent of the value
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of full private ownership. This calculation is
based on standard formulas and a likely range
of percentage rates for discounting future
returns. It follows that the expected value of
one hectare of arable land with 30-year
rights—for agricultural purposes only—would
average about $3,750–$4,750 in a developed
land market. If Chinese farmers enjoy secure
30-year rights, a rural-land transfer market will
most likely develop (and indeed in places
where 30-year rights are secure such markets
are emerging). Using the figure of 121.8 mil-
lion hectares of arable land as the total held by
Chinese farmers,38 the overall value to them of
secure 30-year rights in a developed land mar-
ket would be about $457–$579 billion. With
that increased wealth, farmers could make fur-
ther investments in their land to improve prof-
itability, or liquidate a part or all of their land
rights and use the proceeds to move into high-
er-value opportunities.
Beginning in 2004, the central government
eliminated most agricultural taxes imposed on
farmers and provided some direct subsidies to
farmers.39 Nonetheless, the rural-urban in-
come gap has not been narrowed at all. What
else needs to be done to revitalize China’s rural
economy?
According to our survey, the answer lies in
land rights. One of the key characteristics of
secure land rights is that farmers possess valid,
written documentation affirming such rights.
Chinese law stipulates that farmers are sup-
posed to receive a written land contract and a
written land certificate for their 30-year rights
to contracted land.40 However, local govern-
ments have not been enthusiastic about issu-
ing the contracts or certificates to farmers.
After a decade’s efforts, only about 63 percent
of farmers have received a contract, a certifi-
cate, or both. Moreover, most of the issuances
occurred between 1997 and 1999. 
As it turns out, there is a strong correla-
tion between issuance of contracts or certifi-
cates and farmers’ mid- to long-term invest-
ments in land. Our survey strikingly shows
that the peak years of investments closely fol-
low the peak years of contract/certificate
issuances, with about a two-year time lag (see
Figure 2).
Investment may have dropped after 2002
because farmers had satisfied pent-up invest-
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Source: Zhu Keliang et al., “The Rural Land Question in China: Analysis and Recommendations Based on a
Seventeen-Province Survey,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 38 (February 2006): 798.
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ment desire or because of the growing time
lag between the government’s publicity
efforts and the issuance of land-rights docu-
mentation. Households may also have cho-
sen not to invest because of their growing
concern over illegal takings (some of them
widely publicized) and readjustments.
Further analysis shows that there is prob-
ably a causal link between issuance of con-
tracts or certificates and investments. For
example, among those who held contracts,
16 percent made an investment in or after
1998, while the corresponding percentage
among those who held no documentation is
12.5 percent. As Table 1 shows, the invest-
ment rate in or after 1998 has been highest
among those with both forms of documen-
tation: 24.1 percent. Furthermore, for house-
holds whose contract is in a highly compliant
form and includes start and end dates, maps
or sketch descriptions of their land, and sig-
natures or seals, the investment rate was even
higher: 28.8 percent. In contrast, only 20.2
percent of those who held noncompliant
documentation and 12.0 percent of those
who had no documentation made an invest-
ment.41
This analysis suggests that certificates or
contracts are more effective than no docu-
mentation, both are more effective than
either alone, and compliant certificates or
contracts are more effective than noncompli-
ant ones. Documented land rights—especial-
ly better-documented ones—lead farmers to
believe that they will retain possession of
their present parcels long enough to make a
profit from investments that take multiple
years to recoup. 
It is essential that China pushes the issuance
of documentation to all rural families. The cen-
tral government has in the past shown itself
capable of implementing its rural policies or
programs given the right amount of determi-
nation and resources. In the 1990s, for example,
Chinese farmers were subject to threats such as
recontracting, a two-field system, and scale
farming.42 Such practices seriously under-
mined the security of farmers’ land rights and
were later declared impermissible or disfavored
by the central government. The farmers survey
reveals that the frequency of all of the three
practices decreased noticeably, as shown in
Figure 3.
The same success can be found in the gov-
ernment’s recent efforts to eliminate farmers’
agricultural taxes. The tax reduction pro-
gram became quite effective and far-reaching
in a short period of time between 2004 and
2005, as the central government kicked off a
massive campaign to publicize the policies
and to monitor local implementation.43 If
the Chinese government devotes the same
energy to issuing documentation of land-use
rights, tens of millions of additional rural
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Table 1
Greater Investments Are Related to Well-Documented Land Rights
Investment(s)
Investment(s) Investment(s) made both
No made before made in or before 1998 & Total
investment 1998 after 1998 in or after 1998 (count)
Neither contract nor 
certificate issued 78.7% 7.6% 12.5% 1.2% 100% (649)
Only contract issued 68.8% 11.8% 16.0% 3.5% 100% (144)
Only certificate issued 82.1% 4.0% 12.6% 1.3% 100% (223)
Both contract and 
certificate issued 63.5% 7.0% 24.1% 5.4% 100% (532)
Source: Zhu Keliang et al., “The Rural Land Question in China: Analysis and Recommendations Based on a
Seventeen-Province Survey,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 38 (February 2006): 814.
families will likely receive appropriate docu-
mentation that will greatly improve tenure
security and stimulate investment. 
The New Property Law
In March 2007, after deliberating for over
five years, the National People’s Congress
adopted a Property Law. The first overall
Chinese property law of the post-revolution
period marked a new era in socialist China, as
private property rights finally received full
recognition in formal law. The law contains
fewer ground-breaking provisions than ini-
tially expected, but its adoption is neverthe-
less highly significant. 
Besides the provisions that renew the pre-
sent 30-year term when it expires and reaf-
firms farmers’ legal rights and remedies as
defined by the 2002 RLCL, the Property Law
characterizes farmers’ 30-year land rights as
property rights or rights in rem (as opposed
to the contractual rights defined by previous
laws). Theoretically this type of right pro-
vides greater protection for small farmers’
land rights. Future readjustments will be
much harder to justify. The collective—as the
contract-issuing party that allocates land to
farmers—might still somehow find grounds
to revise or even revoke contracts with farm-
ers, but the currently defined property rights
are less likely to be taken away administra-
tively. Moreover, the law stipulates that full
compensation should be paid when govern-
ment expropriates farmers’ property rights.
The language of the Property Law is unmis-
takable in that the compensation should go
directly into the hands of affected farmers
because they are the holders of the property
that is taken away by state power.
Additional protection for expropriated
farmers comes from a provision mandating
that compensation for confiscated farmland
should ensure the long-term livelihood of the
farmers.44 This signals that the fixed compen-
sation formula set by the 1998 Land
Management Law could be discarded in cir-
cumstances under which compensation based
on that law’s stated multipliers of average
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annual yield of land is insufficient to maintain
farmers’ living standards for the long term. 
However, the Property Law still reflects a
number of general provisions that are vague or
misguided. For example, the law calls for a
unified, national registration of real properties
(land and houses).45 But it avoids some of the
biggest practical questions, such as which gov-
ernment agency will be in charge, and how
future rural-land registration will be merged
and unified with urban registration. In addi-
tion, laws on specific property subjects such as
the Land Management Law should be amend-
ed to become consistent with the Property
Law so that a coherent land-takings regime
can be formed. Nor does the Property Law per-
mit mortgage of agricultural land, forgoing
the opportunity to end the prohibition of
such mortgage in the earlier laws. 
Further Reforms Needed
To ensure China’s sustainable economic
growth and social stability, the central gov-
ernment must conduct significant legal and
institutional reforms and commit itself to
implementing those reforms at the local
level. The following items would help to
improve the rule of law in the countryside
and should top the reform agenda.
Issue Valid and Compliant Land
Contracts and Certificates to All Farmers
Secure land rights confirmed by written
documentation are a necessary condition for
farmers’ making mid- to long-term invest-
ments in land and for promoting market
transfers. The first task for land reformers
should be to make sure that more than 90
percent of all farm households receive at least
a contract or a certificate. The central gov-
ernment should clearly signal that the
achievement of this goal by individual locali-
ties within a pre-determined timetable will be
one of the key issues on which the adequacy
of officials’ performance will be judged. The
central government should further make it
clear that it will widely publicize successes
and failures both within and beyond govern-
ment circles. 
Equally important is that the contracts or
certificates to be issued comply substantially
with controlling laws and regulations and
contain all necessary elements (e.g., adequate
land description, specific starting and ending
dates for the 30-year rights, etc.). In case of
readjustments, takings, or disputes involving
transfers, valid contracts or certificates will
provide stronger protection for farmers’
rights and interests.
Improve Compensation Standards and
Procedural Fairness in Land Takings
The compensation formula fixed by the
1998 Land Management Law has been proven
drastically inadequate. The overarching prin-
ciple should be that the living standard of the
affected people should not be lowered as a
result of the land taking. Because of their rela-
tively low education and skill level, it is
extremely difficult to transform traditional
farmers into urban workers after their land is
gone. Therefore, any compensation package
must be able to ensure long-term livelihood, as
required by the Property Law. Equally impor-
tant, the law needs to make sure that the bulk
of the compensation actually goes to the land-
losing farmers. Since secure 30-year land
rights represent 75–95 percent of the econom-
ic value of full private land ownership, farmers
should be allocated at least 75 percent of the
total compensation, and the share for collec-
tives and local governments should not exceed
25 percent.
Moreover, affected farmers should have the
right to participate in and influence the deci-
sion-making processes. Laws and practices for
land takings should be revised to increase
farmers’ participation in a process that brings
government, commercial developers, collec-
tives, and farmers together to resolve relevant
issues in a far more transparent and democra-
tic manner. Farmers should receive meaning-
ful notices in advance about forthcoming
decisions and be fully informed. Public hear-
ings and legal remedies should be easily acces-
sible to all aggrieved farmers.
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Another important complementary mea-
sure could be the use of an escrow agent in lieu
of directly providing the compensation to the
collectives and then asking the collectives to
distribute it to farmers. Laws need to be
reformed so that an independent state bank46
can be designated as the unit responsible for
receiving the payment of required compensa-
tion from the state or the land developer and
for receiving all documentation from the col-
lectives and land-losing farmers. Upon com-
pletion of the transaction, the escrow agent
would then be responsible for distributing the
compensation directly to affected households,
greatly decreasing the possibility of illegal
interceptions by collectives or local govern-
ments.
Narrow the Scope of Land
Readjustments
The scope of exceptional “special circum-
stances” under which readjustments are
allowed by the Rural Land Contracting Law
should be narrowly defined. There are two
particular circumstances that should not be
treated as “special circumstances.” One is
population change, and the other is land tak-
ings. With regard to population changes, it is
common for a household or a village to expe-
rience fluctuations in the number of family
or village members. Any imbalance between
the size of a piece of land and the number of
people should be addressed by the market for
transferring land rights between farmers, as
it is in all developed economies, rather than
by administrative readjustments that jeopar-
dize everyone’s tenure security. 
Moreover, conducting a readjustment after
a land taking, thus “spreading the pain”
among a larger group of households, should
be prohibited. This type of readjustment is
used to justify the inadequacy of compensa-
tion to land-losing families and, consequently,
jeopardizes tenure security for all. Regardless,
the RLCL is designed to strengthen and pro-
tect farmers’ 30-year land rights from read-
justments. Therefore, a term such as “special
circumstances” must be construed in the light
most favorable to farmers’ land tenure securi-
ty. This interpretation is consistent with not
only the general principle prohibiting re-
adjustments stated both in the Property Law
and the RLCL but also the wishes of the
majority of farmers. 
Increase Farmers’ Knowledge about Land
Laws and Policies
Widespread publicity at the grassroots level
about farmers’ rights, land laws, and govern-
mental land policies is key to protecting farm-
ers’ land rights. Currently, farmers’ knowledge
about what specific rights they have under rel-
evant laws and policies is gravely inadequate.
Consequently, they are unlikely to vindicate
their legal rights when facing illegal takings or
readjustments. A combination of TV, publici-
ty cards, newspaper articles, village meetings,
and other forms of publicity should be uti-
lized to generate maximum educational
impact.47 Any public information campaign
should focus on the rural land-use rights that
are created or defined by the RLCL and reaf-
firmed by the Property Law, especially on
those land rights about which farmers fre-
quently have mistaken beliefs. Preferably,
important elements of this publicity should
continue over an extended period of time.
Introduce and Strengthen Supporting
Institutions 
Supporting institutions for secure land
rights include land registration, a court sys-
tem, and legal aid. Today, there is no land reg-
istration system in rural China, which creates
great uncertainty and hampers the develop-
ment of a land-transfer market. China
should consider establishing a land-registra-
tion system that further validates farmers’
property rights. Furthermore, the courts
must be reformed to make them more acces-
sible and impartial for rural land disputes.
Under the present court system, farmers con-
sistently have little recourse to judicial reso-
lution. Lastly, legal aid should be readily
available to average farmers on land issues,
which will greatly enhance their ability to
assert rights against governmental intru-
sions.
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These supporting institutions are crucial
to enhancing the security of land rights. If
farmers’ rights, even when well documented,
fail to receive recognition in public institu-
tions, then the credibility and value of the
rights will diminish greatly. 
Monitor Progress on Local
Implementation
The central government relies heavily
upon local governments’ reports on land
issues, and the official data on implementa-
tion progress is routinely skewed. To measure
implementation in its various dimensions,
the central government should conduct con-
tinuing assessments through farmer inter-
views, surveys, and telephone hotlines. Steps
should be taken to ensure the objectivity and
accuracy of the findings. Such steps may
include random selection of counties, town-
ships, villages, and households, as well as
direct farmer interviews without the presence
of local officials. These types of assessment
tools are essential to providing the govern-
ment with an accurate picture of farmers’
land rights and ensuring that implementa-
tion of national land laws and policies at local
levels is effective and faithful.
Conclusion
China represents a prime example of what
a little land-tenure security—represented in
1979–84 by the incremental advantages that
even readjustable individual land rights have
over collective farming—can do to dramati-
cally improve hundreds of millions of peo-
ple’s lives. China’s successful transition away
from collective farming to readjustable land-
use rights illustrates the potential impact of
improved land-tenure security on agricultur-
al production. However, as China’s urban-
rural divide continues to worsen, as land tak-
ings accelerate, and as the competition from
foreign agricultural producers intensifies
due to China’s WTO accession, the rural land
question has become ever more relevant.
Powerful evidence supports the view that any
solution to these issues must center on pro-
viding farmers with greater land-tenure secu-
rity. This requires further significant legal
and policy reforms, but it rests even more
importantly upon concrete implementation
at the grassroots level of the already existing
body of law.
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